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Abstract
We present results of the prisoner’s dilemma game on complex networks that have population change. We
introduce a death process with minimum requirements and show that it induces a highly cooperative society.
We also study the effects of immigration on the society. We show that the acceptable number of immigrants
of the society is determined by the population of the society, the ratio of cooperator among immigrants,
and the immigration interval. In addition, if immigrants have a preferential attachment link, the acceptable
number of immigrants increases.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory, Human cooperation, Minimum requirements, Highly cooperative
society, Immigration
1. Introduction
A human cannot live alone without the help of others and has to make a relationship with people based
on mutual cooperation. This network of cooperation is a foundation of the society. However, ironically,
the human is tempted to act selfishly in the society [1, 2]. When others act cooperatively, a selfish human
may gain more benefits than a cooperative human because the selfish human gains cooperation without
investments. In reality, the selfish behavior can be observed often in the society. A human has contradictory
aspects: cooperation and selfishness. It is a challenge to explain this contradiction of human cooperation,
and many pioneers found some conditions that cooperation occurs [3, 4, 5]. However, the answer is not clear
yet.
Recently, the evolutionary game theory has been used to explain how cooperation occurs [6, 7]. The
evolutionary game theory has two major concepts. The first one is a game. Among many kinds of games,
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game well expresses human selfishness and has been studied a lot [5, 8, 9]. In this
paper, we also use the PD game. The other major concept is the imitation process. In the evolutionary
game theory, each node imitates neighbor’s strategy following a given rule [10, 11, 12]. However, the studies
in this field have focused largely on the strategy spreading without population change. In this paper, we
study the effect of population change by including a death process and immigration. The population may
decrease with the death process based on the minimum requirements rule.
Humans have minimum requirements to survive. If a human does not satisfy minimum requirements, the
human is culled (dies out) [13, 14]. For this reason, we set the minimum requirements as the rule of the death
process. In our simulation, if an individual does not satisfy minimum requirements in the previous game,
the individual dies out with a certain probability; it means that the individual cannot adapt in the society.
As a result of the death process with minimum requirements, a highly cooperative society is induced. This
is one possible answer to why humans act cooperatively against others.
A highly cooperative society looks stable and good for meeting minimum requirements. Thus, outsiders
would want to live in the society, and they may immigrate into the society [15]. Although this is happening
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in the real world, immigration occurs restrictively to avoid the disorder of the society [16]. To study why
restrictions are needed, we immigrate nodes in the highly cooperative society and observe the population
change of the society. We show that the maximum number of immigrants the society can accept is influenced
by the conditions of the society and the way of immigration of immigrants.
2. Model and methods
We model the society using the concept of the network. Node and edge of the network represent individual
and relation between the two individuals, respectively. Individuals in a network interact only with individuals
connected by edges. We begin the simulation from the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random network [17]. ER random
network is simple and has been used in many evolutionary dynamics studies [11, 18, 19]. Initially, each node
selects its strategy randomly. After that, at each time step, we implement the PD game, imitation process,
and death process sequentially.
In the PD game, each member can choose one strategy, cooperation (C) or defection (D). Thus, there
are four possible cases: CC, CD, DC, and DD. In each case, payoffs that the individual gains are expressed
in the payoff matrix [10, 11],
C D
C 1 0
D b 0
Here, the temptation of selfish behavior b satisfies 1 < b < 2. This is a weak version of prisoner’s dilemma
game and is used broadly to analyze strategy transitions according to temptation [10, 11].
In the imitation process, imitation probability is given by [11, 12],
Pi→j =
pij − pii
b×max{ki, kj} , when pij > pii. (1)
Pi→j is the probability that node i imitates the strategy of node j. Node j is selected randomly among
neighbors of node i. pii is i’s payoff in the previous round, and ki means the degree of node i. If pij is less
than pii, node i keeps its strategy. Every node has a chance to change its strategy at each time step; after
all the node have decided their next strategies, they update their strategies at the same time synchronously.
In the death process with minimum requirements pir, if pii < pir, then node i dies out with the death
probability Pd. This process may reduce the population, which is the number of nodes in the network.
We also studied effects of immigration (see [20], and references therein). A group of nodes are added in
the network when the network reaches an equilibrium state. Here, we call the action of adding nodes “immi-
gration” and an added node is called “immigrant”, and a node that lived in the society before immigration
is called “native”. The immigration in ordinary condition is usually on a small scale and very selective, and
gives only minor influence on the society. To the contrary, the immigration initiated by special events such
as economic crisis and war causes many immigrants. Since this kind of the immigration is abrupt, it causes
more serious and critical change to the society [21, 22]. Therefore, we focus on this massive immigration
in this paper. We fix the number of immigrants at one time. For example, if 200 immigrants enter the
society and the number of immigrants at one time is 50, then the total number of immigration is 4. The
time interval between immigration is the immigration interval. At the end of all immigration, we simulate
20000 time steps more for adaptation of immigrants. The rule of minimum requirements applies equally to
immigrants. When the immigrants enter the society, they make links with some members of the society.
In our simulation, the number of links of an immigrant is determined within the range of ±1 from 〈k〉 in
the society. (However, if the number of links of immigrants is determined by the degree distribution of the
society, the properties that we will show do not change.) Immigrants connect randomly to members of the
society.
When immigrants enter the society, the population of the society changes. To quantify population change
posed by the immigration, we define the change of population of the society by a unit immigrant χ as
χ ≡ Population change of the society
Total number of immigrants
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Figure 1: (a) Black and red circles represent cooperators and defectors, respectively. If pir ≤ b (left), then the defector satisfies
minimum requirements. However, if pir > b (right), then the defector dies out with probability Pd. (b) The number of total
live nodes (square) and the number of live nodes with cooperative strategy (triangle) as a function of minimum requirements
pir. In this simulation, we set b = 1.2 and the number of nodes of the initial network Ni is 10000. At each simulation, we
simulated until the system was in equilibrium. (At least 20000 time steps were simulated.) 1000 simulations were averaged in
each case. Introduction of minimum requirements induces highly cooperative society through the death process. (inset) The
number of live nodes (Nf ) as a function of the number of initial nodes (Ni). In this simulation, we set b = 1.2 and pir = 2.5.
500 simulations were averaged in each case.
If χ = 1, then all immigrants adapt to the society without the death of natives. On the contrary, if χ = −1,
then the population of the society is reduced by the number of immigrants in spite of the immigration. If
χ = 0, the population of the society does not change. In this paper, we say immigration is successful when
χ > 0. Also, we control three variables to observe the properties of the massive immigration. The first one
is Ri, which is the total number of immigrants with respect to the number of natives before immigration
occurs (N). The second one is the ratio of cooperator among immigrants at each time (Rc). The last one
is the immigration interval.
3. Results and discussion
In order to verify the effect of minimum requirements, we made ER random network of 〈k〉 = 12 and
performed the simulation with Pd = 0.1 and b = 1.2. Figure 1(b) shows the number of live nodes and
the number of live nodes with cooperative strategy as a function of minimum requirements. Since a death
process reduces the number of nodes, the number of nodes in the final network is less than the initial network.
The population of the final network has a linear dependence on that of the initial network as shown in the
inset of Fig. 1(b). Thus, if we start with more initial nodes, we get a larger number of live nodes in the final
network. Note that the cooperation level of the final network is very high even with very small pir. It is
because defector core (defector surrounded by defectors) does not gain any payoff and so its payoff is always
less than pir. Thus, defector cores die out with Pd by the death process.
The results of this simulation have an untrivial point, pir = b. When pir ≤ b, if a defector has at least
one cooperative neighbor, then the defector has no probability to die out. Thus, in this condition, the final
network is not purely cooperative. However, when pir > b, defectors who have only one cooperative neighbor
die out with Pd; defectors need at least two cooperative neighbors. (See Fig. 1(a).) In this condition, the
final network is mostly purely cooperative, though it is not always purely cooperative. When the final
network is purely cooperative, all nodes are cooperator cores (cooperators surrounded by cooperators).
To identifying the properties of the immigration, we firstly set b = 1.2, pir = 2.5, and the immigration
interval to be 1000 in the highly cooperative society. From now on, these values do not change except in
Fig. 3, where the immigration interval varies. We made highly cooperative societies from initial networks
of Ni = 20000, 30000, and 40000. We implemented 10 different societies per each Ni. Each society has a
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Figure 2: We set b = 1.2 and pir = 2.5, and the immigration interval is 1000. (a) χ as a function of Ri for each Ni. In this
simulation, Rc is fixed by 0.8. 1000 simulations were averaged in each society and 10 simulations were averaged among the
same Ni in each point. (b) We make highly cooperative society that the population is N = 7582 and observe χ with varying
Rc and Ri. 1000 simulations were averaged in each case. When the number of immigrants is small and the ratio of cooperator
of immigrants is high, χ is larger than zero. That is, the population of the society becomes larger than before.
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Figure 3: In the same society as in Fig. 2(b), we fix the number of total immigrants to be 450 (Ri ≈ 0.06) and observe χ as a
function of the immigration interval for each Rc. Values of Rc are 0.9, 0.85, 0.8, and 0.7, from top to bottom. 3000 simulations
were averaged in each case.
different number of natives (N). In these societies, we set Rc = 0.8 and the number of immigrants that
immigrate at one time is 1% of N . The results are shown in Fig. 2(a). Average values of N are 4848, 7366,
and 9685 for Ni = 20000, 30000, and 40000, respectively. Since χ values are almost independent on the
population of the society, the maximum number of immigrants for successful immigration is proportional to
the population of the society. For identifying other properties of immigration, we make highly cooperative
society with Ni = 30000 and N = 7582. Also, we fix the number of immigrants at one time to 50 from now
on. In this condition, we observe χ with varying Rc and Ri. The results are shown in Fig. 2(b). When total
number of immigrants Ri is small and Rc is close to 1, the immigration is successful (χ > 0). Note that
χ > 0 if Rc is very close to 1 even when Ri is large. To summarize the results in Fig. 2, the population of the
society before immigration occurs and the attitude (strategy) of immigrants are main factors for successful
immigration.
Figure 3 shows the effect of the immigration interval when Rc and Ri are fixed. For Rc = 0.7, χ does not
depend on the immigration interval. However, for larger Rc, χ increases with larger immigration interval.
When immigrants enter the society, the society undergoes a disturbed time, after which the society returns
to a highly cooperative society. Thus, χ is saturated when the immigration interval is larger than the
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Figure 4: We use the same society as in Fig. 2(b). (a) χ by the invasion for each society, which has different Ri and only
cooperative immigrants. 1000 simulations were averaged in each case. When Ri is larger than 0.075, χ is negative. (b) χ as
a function of Rc for two highly cooperative societies with and without immigrants. The total number of immigrants is 200
(Ri ≈ 0.02) and the population is 7582 in both societies. 1000 simulations were averaged in each case.
disturbed time. To increase the total number of immigrants while maintaining χ > 0, the society needs
enough immigration interval.
Now, we consider an extreme case. We suppose that all immigrants are cooperative. Since immigration
does not introduce a defective strategy in the society, χ is always 1 and the population of the society can
grow infinitely. The question is whether the society changes its structure qualitatively with respect to the
stability by the cooperative immigrants. In this paper, we define that the society is stable if the society
maintains positive χ when 20 defective invaders enter the society.
To verify the stability of the society, we immigrate only cooperative immigrants into the society until
satisfying Ri we want. After that, 10 defective invaders enter the society (invasion). Next, we simulate
1000 time steps, and then 10 defective invaders enter the society once again. (Invasion interval is 1000.)
After the second invasion, we simulate 20000 time steps more for adaptation of invaders. The results of
the invasion are shown in Fig. 4(a). When Ri is small, χ > 0. However, although the number of defective
invaders is very small compared to the population of the society, χ is negative by invasion when Ri is large.
It is because immigration makes the structure of the society unstable. To verify this, we made two kinds
of highly cooperative societies of N = 7582. The first one has only natives and the second one is composed
of 7388 natives and 194 immigrants. (The immigration in the second society occurred in four times: three
times of 50 immigrants and once in 44 immigrants.) Figure 4(b) compares values of χ by 200 additional
immigrants in the two societies as a function of Rc. In the same Rc, χ of the society that is made up of
natives and immigrants is less than χ of the society that is made up of only natives except for Rc = 1. The
difference of χ increases as the ratio of the immigrants in the society increases. The society that is made up
of natives and immigrants is vulnerable to the immigration of defectors. Thus, even if all immigrants have
a cooperative strategy, the society may have to restrict the number of immigrants for the stability of the
society.
Until now, we assumed that immigrants connect randomly to members of the society [20]. This approach
is reasonable when immigrants have no information about the society. However, what if they have some
information about members of the society? In the real world, immigrants may gather some information
about the society and prepare for future treats. To study this effect, we adopt preferential attachment
[23, 24]. Preferential attachment uses the degree of each member to be regarded as the member’s reputation
in the society. A person who has a high reputation is considered successful in the society, and immigrants
want to have a relationship with the person. We simulate in the same society as in Fig. 2(b), but each
immigrant has one preferential attachment link. The other links are connected randomly as before.
As shown in Fig. 5, when immigrants have one preferential attachment, the number of acceptable im-
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Figure 5: Plot of χ as a function of Ri with and without the preferential attachment (PA). The society before immigration is the
same as in Fig. 2(b) and Rc = 0.8. Preferential attachment increases the number of acceptable immigrants while maintaining
χ > 0. 1000 simulations were averaged in each case.
migrants while maintaining χ > 0 increases substantially. It is because immigrants can accept a suitable
strategy in the society through a neighbor connected by the preferential attachment.
4. Conclusions
We have observed the effects of minimum requirements and immigration in the prisoner’s dilemma
game. Minimum requirements condition induces a highly cooperative society. When immigration occurs
in this highly cooperative society, the number of immigrants that the society can accept while maintaining
successful immigration depends on the population of the society, the ratio of cooperator among immigrants,
and the immigration interval. In addition, changing the connection rule of immigrant’s link from a random
connection to a preferential attachment increases it. Additionally, even if all immigrants are cooperative,
the excessive acceptance of immigrants makes the society unstable.
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